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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
ATONIO v. WARDS COVE PACKING 
COMPANY: EN BANC APPROVAL OF 
DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR 
SUBJECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing CO.l the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en bane, resolved a conflict which had developed within 
the circuit regarding the proper analysis of certain employment 
discrimination claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.2 At issue was whether an employer's subjective hir-
ing and promotion practices should be found unlawful based on 
their adverse impact upon minority employees.3 In reversing a 
panel decision,4 the full bench of the Ninth Circuit held that 
subjective employment practices which are demonstrably con-
nected to a disproportionate burden on protected groups are fair 
game for disparate impact analysis and consequent employer 
liability}' 
1. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Tang, J. en bane consideration; Sneed, J. filed 
concurring opinion in which Goodwin, J., Wallace, J., and Anderson, J. joined). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982). 
3. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1478. Subjective practices are those which allow employment 
decisions to consider the' decision maker's discretion. Objective practices are based upon 
fixed, measurable factors which eliminate discretion from the decision making process. 
See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 201-05 (2d ed. 1983 & 
supp. 1987) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN]. 
4. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 
117-24 and accompanying text. 
5. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1486. 
127 
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II. FACTS 
This class action was brought by Filipino and Alaskan Na-
tive workers employed in the Alaskan salmon canning industry.6 
The workers alleged that the defendant employer's hiring prac-
tices were discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19647 and of section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.8 The company's operations required a large number of un-
skilled seasonal workers and a smaller number of skilled employ-
ees, some employed on a permanent basis.9 Most of the unskilled 
jobs were filled by non-white workers while the more desirable, 
skilled, higher paying positions were occupied by whites.IO Spe-
cific qualifications for the higher paying jobs were not well de-
fined and individual hiring officers had wide discretion in deter-
mining who was best for each job.ll 
The suit alleged that the disproportionate concentration of 
non-whites in the lowest paying jobs and the virtual absence of 
minorities in the skilled, higher paying positions was proof of 
discrimination against non-whites.I2 The complaint also alleged 
that the employer's use of separate hiring channels, word-of-
mouth recruitment, nepotism and rehiring policies, together 
with the lack of objective job qualifications and the use of sub-
jective criteria in hiring and promotions all had an unlawful dis-
parate impact on minorities. IS 
6. Id. at 1479. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984). 
Domingo began as a companion case to Atonio. The plaintiffs were cannery workers with 
claims virtually identical to those in Atonio. The district court found unlawful discrimi-
nation using disparate impact analysis. Id. at 1435. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the 
basis of intentional discrimination. Defendants used racial labels in job assignments; 
thus their practices were not facially neutral. Id. at 1436. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). 
9. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1479. 
10. Id. The skilled jobs included machinists, engineers, quality-control personnel, 
cooks, bookkeepers, carpenters and others. The permanent employees were management 
and office personnel as well as a number of maintainance workers. Atonio v. Wards Cove 
Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1985). 
11. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1124. 
12. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1479. 
13. Id. Plaintiffs had also charged that the defendants violated Title VII by segre-
gating the non-white workers into inferior housing and messing facilities. The district 
court found that these practices did not violate Title VII. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1130-31. 
The majority en banc opinion did not specifically address these claims. 
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The district court found that although the plaintiffs had 
successfully made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
defendants had rebutted the inference of intentional discrimina-
tion by convincingly showing nondiscriminatory motivations.14 
The trial judge refused to apply disparate impact analysis to the 
subjective hiring and promotion practices citing Ninth Circuit 
precedent.I6 A Ninth Circuit panel, while acknowledging the ex-
istence of a conflict within the circuit, affirmed.I6 The plaintiffs' 
petition for a rehearing was granted so that the conflict could be 
resolved en banc.17 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful 
for an employer to discriminate against any employee on the ba-
sis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. IS The Act regu-
lates all aspects of the employment relationship and provides for 
only limited exemptions.I9 The Supreme Court has stated that 
the objective of Title VII is the eradication of unnecessary barri-
ers which impede the achievement of equal employment 
14. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1120. 
15. Id. at 1131. The district court applied disparate impact analysis to the allegation 
of nepotism but found no discrimination. Id. 
16. Id. at 1132-33. See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. 
17. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) permits classifications based on sex, religion or 
national origin (but not race or color) where sex, religion or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) permits employers to apply different 
standards pursuant to bona fide seniority or merit systems and to act upon the results of 
professionally developed ability tests provided such system or test is not intentionally 
designed to discriminate. 
3
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opportunity.20 
The Supreme Court recognizes two theories under which Ti-
tle VII violations can be proved: (1) disparate treatment and (2) 
disparate impact.21 Under the disparate treatment theory, an 
employer violates Title VII by intentionally treating people less 
favorably because of their race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.22 The disparate impact theory, in contrast, predicates 
employer liability on the significant adverse impact of an em-
ployer's facially neutral practice which cannot be justified by 
business necessity.23 In practical terms, a crucial difference be-
tween the two theories is the necessity of proving an employer's 
discriminatory motive.24 The Supreme Court has stated that 
such proof is "critical" to a disparate treatment case but is "not 
required under a disparate-impact theory."25 
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff will always retain 
the burden of persuasion26 but the burden of producing evidence 
will shift.27 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case 
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971). See infra notes 35-41 
and accompanying text. 
21. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 
(1977). In a suit brought by the government, a union and a trucking firm were found to 
have intentionally engaged in a pattern of discriminatory treatment of blacks and Span-
ish-surnamed persons. [d. at 342. The court held that Congress' vesting of broad equita-
ble powers in Title VII courts enabled them to fashion the most complete relief possible 
to remedy violations under the Act. [d. at 364. Such relief can include awards of retroac-
tive seniority to persons who could prove that they were deterred from seeking employ-
ment by their knowledge of the discriminatory practices. [d. at 367. 
22. [d. at 335 n.15. 
23. [d. at 336 n.15. 
24. [d. at 335 n.15. 
25. [d. The Supreme Court has stated that either theory may be applied to a partic-
ular set of facts. [d. at 336 n.15. 
26. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). A fe-
male denied promotion to a position subsequently filled by a male successfully estab-
lished a prima facie case of sex discrimination. [d. at 251. The court of appeals held that 
the employer must rebut by proving his nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions by a 
preponderance of the evidence. [d. at 256. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the 
burden of persuasion was always on the plaintiff. [d.' . 
27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). After being laid 
off, plaintiff participated in an illegal demonstration to protest the employer's racial poli-
cies. [d. at 794. The employer refused to rehire plaintiff ostensibly because of plaintiff's 
prior illegal conduct. [d. at 796. The district court found this reason sufficent to support 
dismissal of the case. [d. at 797. The Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff's prima 
facie case has been rebutted he must still be afforded an opportunity to prove that the 
employer's otherwise legitimate reason was actually a pretext for unlawful discrimina-
4
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of intentionally discriminatory treatment.28 The prima facie case 
creates a rebuttable presumption and shifts the burden of pro-
duction to the employer.29 The employer meets this burden by 
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the al-
leged discriminatory action.30 The burden then returns to the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason 
is, in fact, a pretext for unlawful discrimination.31 In Fumco 
Construction Corp. v. Waters,32 the Supreme Court emphasized 
that the primary function of this order of proof is to analyze and 
evaluate the evidence for its bearing on the critical question of 
discrimination.33 
In contrast to disparate treatment's preoccupation with un-
lawful motivation, the disparate impact theory defines illegal 
discrimination as the use of a selection device which adversely 
and disproportionately affects a protected minority and cannot 
be justified by business necessity regardless of the employer's 
motivation.34 The Supreme Court first adopted disparate impact 
analysis in the landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power CO.3/) At is-
sue in Griggs was the employer's use of a standardized intelli-
gence test and a high school diploma as prerequisites for em-
tion. Id. at 804. 
28. Id. at 802. The precise elements of a prima facie showing will vary with the 
particular facts of a case. Id. at 802 n.13. See also International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (any production of evidence "adequate to 
create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion 
illegal under the Act" was sufficient to make a prima facie disparate treatment case). 
29. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. See supra note 26. 
30. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See supra note 27. See also Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 254-55, where the Court stated that while the defendant need not persuade the 
court, he must support his articulated reason by introducing sufficent evidence to justify 
a judgment in his favor. By carrying this burden the defendant rebuts the plaintiff's 
prima facie case. Id. at 255. Failure to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case will result in 
a directed verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 254. 
31. MeDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Pretext can be proven by showing that the 
defendant's proffered reason was either not the actual motivating factor or that it was 
simply not believable. Id. 
32. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
33. Id. at 577. 
34. D. BALDUS AND J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 1.23 at 44-45 
(1980 & Supp. 1986). 
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 
59,62 (1972) (discussion of the background and implications of Griggs: "Griggs is in the 
tradition of the great cases of constitutional and tort law which announce and apply 
fundamental legal principles to the resolution of basic and difficult problems of human 
relationships."). 
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ployment.36 The plaintiffs demonstrated that these requirements 
served to exclude blacks at a substantially higher rate than 
whites.37 The district court and the court of appeals found that 
the requirements had not been implemented for a discrimina-
tory purpose and hence there was no violation of Title VII.38 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that practices which oper-
ate to exclude blacks from employment opportunities are pro-
hibited unless they are necessary to the employer's business.39 
Such practices cannot be saved by the absence of intentional 
discrimination.40 The consequences of employment practices 
may render those practices unlawful under Title VII just as 
readily as their motivation.41 
To succeed under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff's 
prima facie case must establish that the employer's neutral 
screening requirement produces a significantly discriminatory 
pattern of employee selection.42 The burden then shifts to the 
employer to prove that the challenged requirement or practice is 
manifestly related to the particular job in question.43 However, 
36. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. 
37. Id. at 430 n.6. 
38. Id. at 428. 
39. Id. at 431. The Court referred to business necessity as the touchstone. Id. It 
found that Congress had mandated that objective, demonstrably job-related qualifica-
tions govern the employment relationship so that race, sex, religion and nationality 
would become irrelevant in measuring a person for a job. Id. at 436. 
40. Id. at 432. 
41. Id. Title VII had been in effect for less than six years when Griggs was decided. 
Prior to passage of Title VII, Duke Power, a South Carolina employer, had openly dis-
criminated against blacks. Id. at 426-27. Discrimination in South Carolina schools had 
also led to blacks receiving inferior educations. Id. at 430. The Court recognized that 
under Title VII this pre-Act discrimination could not be allowed to perpetuate itself. Id. 
42. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). A female plaintiff challenged 
the height, weight and gender requirements that the Alabama Board of Corrections im-
posed on applicants for the position of correctional officer. Id. at 324. The Supreme 
Court held that the height and weight requirements failed to meet the job-relatedness 
standard under Griggs analysis. Id. at 332. The gender requirement was held valid as a 
bona fide occupational qualification. Id. at 336-37. 
The statistical showing necessary to establish that a disparity is significant has be-
come a major battleground for Title VII disparate impact litigation. See SeHLEI AND 
GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 98-102. 
43. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). A class of black em-
ployees alleged that the employer's use of employment tests which had an adverse im-
pact on blacks violated Title VII. Id. at 409. The district court found that the tests were 
job-related on the basis of a company validation study. Id. at 411. The Supreme Court 
held that the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures provided the 
standard for measuring the job-relatedness of employment tests and that the tests in 
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whereas the employer's rebuttal burden in a disparate treatment 
case is merely one of producing sufficent evidence to rebut the 
inference created by the plaintiff's prima facie case,44 in a dispa-
rate impact case he carries a burden of persuasion at this stage!!> 
The employer must persuade the fact-finder that the challenged 
practice is necessary to safe and efficient job performance.46 
Thus, business necessity is an affirmative defense of the use of a 
practice that has been shown to be discriminatory in effect.4,1 
The existence of this weightier rebuttal burden helps explain 
why employers would prefer to defend against a disparate treat-
ment claim. 
The Supreme Court has held the disparate impact theory 
applicable to measure the impact of each component of a selec-
tion system even if the impact of the complete system is racially 
proportionate.48 Thus far the Supreme Court has directly ap-
plied the disparate impact theory only to clearly defined, non-
discretionary selection devices which were facially neutral.49 In 
question did not meet this standard. Id. at 430-31. 
44. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
46. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. The defendant's burden has been described both 
in terms of business necessity, Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, and job-relatedness, Albemarle 
Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. Although they are frequently used interchangeably, there is some 
question as to whether the two concepts are identical. See Note, Business Necessity: 
Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 388-89 
(1981) (Supreme Court's failure to adequately define the business necessity defense has 
permitted the lowering of strict Title VII standards and has resulted in lower court con-
fusion). See also Johnson, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs and 
the Death of Employee Testing, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1257 (1976) (Supreme Court 
deference to EEOC Guidelines for validating the job-relatedness of employee tests con-
demned as imposing impossible burden on employers). 
47. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. If the employer proves the necessity of the 
challenged practice, the plaintiff may still triumph by proving that the employer's legiti-
mate interest may be equally well served by a less discriminatory device. Id. 
48. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455-56 (1982). An examination used to screen 
promotion candidates had a disproportionate impact on blacks and was not job-related. 
Id. at 445. Unsuccessful black examinees sued under the disparate impact theory. Id. at 
444. The employer defended by proving that successful black examinees were promoted 
at higher rates than whites so as to correct any adverse impact on blacks. Id. The Su-
preme Court in a 5-4 decision rejected this "bottom line" defense. Id. at 452. The major-
ity emphasized that Title VII protects the rights of individuals and that if the examina-
tion was not job-related its disparate impact was proof of a Title VII violation. Id. at 
448. The dissent believed that the disparate impact theory was only relevant to measure 
the final results of a selection process. Id. at 458. (Powell, J., dissenting). 
49. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 445 (standardized test); New York Transit Authority v. 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (blanket exclusion of methadone users held justified by 
business necessity despite disproportionate impact on minority applicants); Dothard, 433 
7
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Fumco Construction Corp. v. Waters tlo the defendant's foreman, 
who had complete discretion in hiring decisions, refused to ac-
cept walk-on jon site applications and instead hired only persons 
known or recommended to him as experienced. til The plaintiffs, 
qualified black bricklayers who applied at the job site, con-
tended that this policy had a disproportionate impact on 
blacks. tl2 The SUpreme Court decided that the proper analysis 
for the caie was under the disparate treatment theory.tl3 In a 
footnote the Court noted that the challenged practice did not 
involve 'efuployment tests or physical requirements such as had 
previously been analyzed under the disparate impact model. tI4 
This footnote has been read as evidence of a deliberate Supreme 
Court intention to restrict the scope of the disparate impact the-
ory to purely objective practices.tIti 
B. SUBJECTIvE CRITERIA AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
Title VII gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) the authority to issue, amend or rescind proce-
dural regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act. tl6 The 
EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 
first published in 1970, define discrimination as the use of a se-
lection procedure which has an adverse impact on a protected 
U.S. at 329-31 (minimum height and weight requirements); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 
427 (standardized intelligence test); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (standardized tests, high 
school diploma requirement). 
50. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
51. [d. at 569-70. 
52. [d. at 570. The district court subjected the claim to Griggs analysis but found 
there had been no showing that the practice had a disproportionate effect. 
53. [d. at 575. 
54. [d. at 575 n.7. Writing separately, Justice Marshall did not dispute that the dis-
parate treatment approach could be used to analyze the workers claims. [d. at 582 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But he identified word-of-mouth 
recruitment and the limiting of hiring to those with prior experience working for a par-
ticular employer as facially neutral practices which could be analyzed under the dispa-
rate impact theory. [d. at 583 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
55. 3 A. LARSON AND L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 76.32 (1987 & 1987 
Supp.) Professor Larson contends that because the foreman had unlimited discretion in 
hiring decisions, the practice of refusing to hire job site applicants actually had a subjec-
tive basis. His position is that restricting Griggs analysis to purely objective practices is 
sound because of (1) the difficulty in validating subjective decisions and (2) a conceptual 
incompatibility between disparate impact analysis and subjective judgments. [d. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982). 
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class and which cannot be validated. 57 By adopting this ap-
proach in Griggs, the Supreme Court definitively brought unin-
tentional discrimination within the reach of the Act.58 The Uni-
form Guidelines, which the Supreme Court has accorded great 
deference,59 include subjective interviews in its definition of em-
ployee selection procedures.60 
In 1972 Congress amended Title VII to expand its cover-
age61 and to provide enforcement powers to the EEOC.62 At the 
time that the amendments became law the Uniform Guidelines 
had been published and Griggs had been decided. In adopting 
the amendments, Congress did not intend to change existing 
law, as developed by the courts, except where expressly ad-
dressed.63 Lower court decisions, pre-dating Griggs, had applied 
disparate impact analysis to subjective employment practices.64 
Neither Congress nor the Griggs opinion expressly restricted the 
use of disparate impact analysis to purely objective practices.65 
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1987). 
58. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
59. Id. at 433-34; Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431. 
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16 (1987) provides: 
(Q) Selection procedure. Any measure, combination of mea-
sures, or procedure used as a basis for any employment deci-
sion. Selection procedures include the full range of assessment 
techniques from traditional paper and pencil tests, perform-
ance tests, training programs or probationary periods and 
physical, educational and work experience requirements 
through informal or casual interviews and unscored applica-
tion forms. 
61. The 1972 amendments deleted the original exemptions of state and local govern-
ment employees and employees of educational institutions from Title VII coverage. Pub. 
L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 (1982». 
62. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 
(1982». 
63. Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 884-85 (1972) (objective analysis of 1972 amendments and re-
view of their legislative history). 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 449 F.2d 800, 804 (4tlI Cir. 1970) 
Hiring and assignment system without uniform objective standards which vested wide 
discretionary authority in departmental supervisors produced a racially imbalanced 
workforce with blacks concentrated in less desirable jobs. The Fourth Circuit held that 
such practices, although not overtly discriminatory, classify and segregate on the basis of 
race. 
65. Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely considered the issue of subjec-
tive practices, in Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 433, the Court critici2ed the employer's 
reliance on subjective supervisor ratings which were offered as validation of a pencil-and-
paper test. The Court was manifestly skeptical of a practice in which subjective judg-
ments were the basis of the employer's assertion of job-relatedness. Id. 
9
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During the decade following Griggs lower courts consist-
ently applied the Griggs doctrine to subjective employment 
practices. The leading case is Rowe v. General Motors,66 in 
which black hourly employees challenged the company's practice 
of promoting workers based on a foreman's subjective evaluation 
of an individual's ability.67 The plaintiffs introduced statistical 
evidence of a significant disparity in employment opportunities 
for blacks.68 The Fifth Circuit quoted Griggs in condemning 
General Motors' (GM) reliance on the subjective judgments of 
its foremen.69 Only legitimate business necessity could excuse a 
practice which even inadvertently disadvantaged minority em-
ployees.7o The GM procedure, as applied, violated Title VII be-
cause there was no proof that the affected blacks were unquali-
fied for the higher positions.71 Rather than being job-related, 
GM's subjective recommendation system provided an avenue for 
the individual prejudices of the foremen.72 The Fifth Circuit was 
careful not to accuse either GM73 or its foremen of intentionally 
discriminating but explicitly recognized the potential for sub-
conscious discrimination.74 
In Griggs, the Supreme Court had indicated that objective 
qualifications that were manifestly job-related should control 
employee selection procedures.75 The Rowe doctrine postulated 
that subjective practices afforded a ready mechanism for dis-
crimination which could be proved through disparate impact 
analysis.76 The Rowe rationale was widely followed.77 Disparate 
66. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). 
67. [d. at 353. 
68. [d. at 357. 
69. [d. at 354. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 358·59. Rowe identified five factors which contributed to the unlawful sys-
tem: (1) The foreman's recommendation was the most important single factor in the 
promotion process; (2) Foremen were not given written instructions pertaining to the 
qualifications necessary for promotions; (3) The foremen's own standards were vague and 
subjective; (4) Employees were not notified of openings nor informed of necessary quali-
fications; (5) There were no safeguards to prevent discrimination. [d. 
72. [d. at 359. 
73. [d. at 355. GM was praised for its affirmative recruiting of blacks, but in spite of 
these laudable steps the company's current policies might still be in violation of Title 
VII. [d. 
74. [d. at 359. 
75. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). See supra note 39. 
76. Rowe, 457 F.2d at 359. See also Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 
457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.) (subjective standards are badges of discrimination which 
10
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impact analysis was applied to subjective criteria through the 
entire gamut of employment determinations from recruitment to 
layoffs.78 The mere use of subjective determinations was suffi-
cient to raise a suspicion of discrimination although, without 
proof of a disparate impact, such practices were not per se 
unlawful.79 
Ten years after Griggs, the Ninth Circuit, in Heagney v. 
University of Washington,80 refused to use the disparate impact 
theory to evaluate an employer's discretionary classification sys-
tem.81 The University categorized non-academic employees as ei-
ther "classified" or "exempt".82 Classified employees had their 
salaries set by state law and adjusted by an administrative 
agency.83 Exempt employees filled jobs with unique or un-
standardized requirements and had their salaries set and ad-
justed at the discretion of the University.84 The plaintiff was a 
research scientist whose job was categorized as "exempt".85 She 
maintained that her salary was lower than comparably situated 
males because of the University's discrimination.86 In her suit, 
she alleged both disparate treatment and disparate impact.87 
Before remanding for further consideration of the disparate 
corroborate the inference of discrimination drawn from statistical disparity in the work 
force), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972). 
77. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rowe appli-
cable to group decisions); James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 329 
(5th Cir. 1977) (disparate impact analysis of subjectively decided job assignments), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Senter v. General Motors, 532 F.2d 511, 526-30 (6th Cir.) 
(cited and followed Rowe in applying Griggs to subjective promotion scheme), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th 
Cir. 1975) (vague subjective promotion decisions condemned under Rowe-Griggs analy-
sis); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.) (subjective criteria 
provide possibilities for abuse), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Baxter v. 
Savannah Sugar Refining Co., 495 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 1974) (subjective promotion 
system the cause of discrimination). 
78. Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. 
REV. 737, 745 (1976) (synthesis of decisions involving subjective criteria offering prag-
matic guidance for practitioners). 
79. Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974) (subjective hiring 
procedure need not be validated where there was no discriminatory pattern). 
80. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981). 
81. ld. at 1163. 
82. ld. at 1159. 
83.ld. 
84.ld. 
85.ld. 
86. ld. at 1158-59. 
87. ld. at 1163. 
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treatment claim, the court briefly discussed whether her charge 
could be analyzed under Griggs.ss 
The plaintiff contended that the University's practice of 
categorizing jobs as "classified" or "exempt" was a facially neu-
tral practice which could be shown statistically to have a dispro-
portionate impact on the salaries of female employees.s9 Without 
elaboration, the Ninth Circuit simply concluded that the Uni-
versity's practice could not be equated with objective practices 
and that disparate impact analysis was inappropriate.9o Subjec-
tive employment decisions, such as the classifying of employees 
or the discretionary setting of salaries, must be shown to be in-
tentionally discriminatory.91 The court cited no authority for its 
refusal to require that the University prove the "job related-
ness" of its practice. 
In Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America92 the 
employer's entire promotion scheme, which included subjective 
components, was challenged.93 The plaintiffs provided evidence 
of a racial imbalance94 but the Fifth Circuit refused to allow a 
disparate impact attack on the cumulative effect of the com-
pany's policies.95 Only the specific practice identified as respon-
sible for the disparate impact need be validated.96 An employer 
would be unfairly handicapped if forced to validate all of his 
practices upon the bare showing of a statistical disparity.97 The 
Pouncy court demanded proof of a causal connection between 
the disparity and the challenged employment practice.98 The 
Fifth Circuit panel also objected that subjective practices were 
riot akin to the traditional bases for disparate impact analysis.99 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. The opinion does not explain why the University's system of classification 
could not be considered a facially neutral practice suitable for Griggs analysis. 
91. [d. 
92. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). 
93. [d. at 799. Job vacancies were not posted but rather white supervisors selected 
candidates for promotion using minimal objective criteria. Also, employee performance 
evaluations were rated largely on a subjective basis. [d. 
94. [d. at 799. 
95. [d. at 800. 
96. [d. at 801. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. In declaring that subjective practices were not "akin" to the traditional ob-
12
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For authority the Pouncy court cited a treatise,t°o whose defini-
tion of "neutral employment practices" is limited strictly to 
those purely objective requirements considered in Griggs and 
Albemarle Paper v. Moody.lOl The Fifth Circuit panel failed to 
discuss the Rowe doctrine even though Rowe was cited approv-
ingly in the casel02 and was precedent for the Pouncy court to 
follow or distinguish. 
In the aftermath of Heagney and Pouncy a previously set-
tled area of the law became markedly fractured. loa The Ninth 
jects of disparate impact analysis, the Pouncy court adopted a conclusional approach 
similar to that employed in Heagney. Neither court expounded on the critical differences 
between objective and subjective practices which warrant disparate impact analysis of 
the former but which deny application of the theory to the latter. 
100. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 801. 
101. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 73.00 (1987 & 1987 
Supp.). See supra note 55. 
102. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800 n.7. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
103. There is currently much disagreement on the issue throughout the circuits. The 
First Circuit has not had to decide the issue. See Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v. 
Secretary of Housing, 799 F.2d 774, 787 (1st Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Polaroid, 732 F.2d 
1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1984). 
The Second Circuit has generally applied disparate impact analysis to subjective 
practices. See Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F.2d 85, 95-96 (2nd Cir. 1984) (subjec-
tive tenure process examined); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel, 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2nd Cir. 
1980) (subjective-word-of-mouth hiring methods). But see Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, 
Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 605 (2nd Cir. 1986) (refusal to extend disparate impact analysis to 
subjective criteria). 
The Third Circuit has applied Griggs analysis to a promotion process which includes 
subjective components. Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 672, 674 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
The Fourth Circuit currently refuses to apply disparate impact analysis to subjective 
criteria despite an earlier history of following Rowe. See, EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 
698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983) (disparate impact analysis only applicable to objective 
standards), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 
867 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20,22 (4th Cir. 1982). But see, Brown v. 
Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 982 (1972). 
The Fifth Circuit generally adheres to the position that it took in Pouncy v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 797 n.12 (5th Cir. 1986) (discretionary promotion 
procedure does not fit impact analysis), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3227 (1987); Cunning-
ham v. Housing Authority, 764 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985) (disparate treatment ap-
plicable to subjective hiring and promotion decisions); Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d1266, 
1271 (5th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact not appropriate for discretionary promotion pro-
cedure); Walls v. Mississippi State Dept. of Public Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 321 (5th Cir. 
1984) (use of subjective criteria analyzed under disparate treatment model); Vuyanich v. 
Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir.) (disparate impact not the proper 
model to measure discriminatory hiring statistics), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); 
Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1983) (disparate impact 
13
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Circuit has noted the inherent dangers of the use of subjective 
model inapplicable to subjective hiring and placement evaluations); Carpenter v. Ste-
phan F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 1983) (Pouncy dictates that 
discretionary decisions be examined for discriminatory intent); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 
F.2d 776, 779 n.6, (5th Cir. 1983) (subjective decisions analyzed under disparate treat-
ment model); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir.) 
(discretionary decisions not within scope of disparate impact model), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 991 (1983); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th Cir.) (subjective 
hiring interviews not subject to impact analysis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982). But 
see, Page v. U.S. Industries, 726 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984) (despite Pouncy, Rowe 
still permits impact analysis of subjective practices); Harrell v. Northern Elec. Co., 672 
F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir.) (subjective evaluations not sufficient business justification to 
refute disparate impact showing), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982). 
The Seventh Circuit cases have been on both sides of the issue. See Regner v. City 
of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing a disparate impact claim to pro-
ceed in reference to a subjective evaluation process); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 
921, 927 (7th Cir.) (applying disparate impact analysis to word-of-mouth recruitment 
and separate hiring channels), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982). But see Griffin v. Board 
of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281, 1288 n.14, (7th Cir. 1986) (disparate impact analysis inappro· 
priate for subjective faculty hiring decisions). 
The Eighth Circuit has recently indicated a willingness to apply disparate impact 
analysis to subjective decision-making. See EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 
327-28 (8th Cir.) (subjective hiring practices which have disparate impact on women 
must be justified by business necessity), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 307, (1986); Jones v. 
Hutto, 763 F.2d 979, 983-84 (8th Cir.) (adverse impact of excessively subjective practices 
was sufficent premise for liability), vacated on other grounds, 106 S.Ct. 242 (1985). See 
also Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 772 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir.) (apparent willingness to 
apply disparate impact analysis to subjective promotion claim), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 
972 (1984). But see Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir. 
1983) (subjective decision-making system cannot form the foundation of a disparate im-
pact case); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (improper 
use of subjective procedures for demotions not a Griggs-type case). 
The Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits apply the disparate 
impact theory to all manner of subjectively-based employment practices. See Lojan.v. 
Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917, 930 n.19 (6th Cir. 1985) (use of subjective 
criteria is a facially neutral practice subject to Griggs analysis); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneu-
matic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 93 (6th Cir. 1982) (subjective evaluations scrutinized under both 
theories); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985) (impact analysis proper 
to evaluate use of subjective practices); Lasso v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 
741 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.1 (10th Cir.) (impact analysis appropriate for subjective promotion 
policy), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (lOth 
Cir. 1981) (purpose of Griggs approach is to restrict use of subjective practices causing 
disparate impact); Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1981) (im-
pact analysis appropriate for subjective policies); Williams v. Colorado Springs School 
Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) (impact analysis appropriate for hiring 
system vesting nearly total discretion in school principals); Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line 
Ry., 767 F.2d 771, 776 (11th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact theory applicable to subjective 
selection process); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985) (subjective 
promotion process is facially neutral practice vulnerable to attack by disparate impact 
analysis); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d1516, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact 
theory is appropriate to challenge selection process containing subjective elements); 
Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 619-20, (11th Cir. 1983) (subjective 
selection and promotion procedures open to disparate impact attack), cert. denied sub 
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criteria in the disparate treatment contextlO4 but has not found 
them per se prohibited by Title VII.lol> In conflict with Heagney 
is Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman/o6 decided one year after 
Heagney. The plaintiff in Wang challenged an entire promotion 
process, which contained subjective components, under both dis-
parate impact and disparate treatment theories.lo7 The district 
court analyzed the claim only under disparate treatment and 
found that there was no discrimination because the plaintiff was 
not the most qualified applicant. lOS The panel reversed and re-
manded to resolve the disparate impact claim.lo9 The Wang 
court believed that it would be anomolous to require the plain-
tiff to prove that he was the most qualified under the promotion 
system when he was alleging that the system itself was discrimi-
natory and not sufficiently job-related.Ho First, the system itself 
would have to be examined for its impact and, if found to have a 
disproportionate effect on minorities, it would have to be proven 
to be job-related.lll The panel took note of the highly subjective 
nom James v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 104 U.S. 1415 (1984); Segar v. Smith, 738 
F.2d 1249, 1270-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no sound policy reason not to apply impact analysis 
to employment practices causing disparate impact), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). 
104. See Kimbrough v. Secretary of United States Air Force, 764 F.2d 1279, 1284 
(9th Cir. 1985). In Kimbrough a qualified black applicant was denied a promotion based 
on subjective evaluations. Id. at 1281. The court found discriminatory treatment holding 
that a subjective promotion process, while not discriminatory per se, should be scruti-
nized closely for evidence of abuse. Id. at 1284; see also Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 
1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981). In Nanty a qualified Native American applicant was summa-
rily refused an opportunity to apply for a job vacancy. Id. at 1329-30. His prima facie 
disparate treatment case went unrebutted. Id. at 1332. In remanding to determine 
whether plaintiff would have been hired in the absence of discrimination for the purpose 
of fashioning relief, the court cautioned that subjective criteria should be viewed with 
much skepticism. Id. at 1334; Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d 
1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981). In Lynn a female professor was denied tenure despite fulfil-
ling objective requirements. Id. at 1340. Court found statistical data of pattern of sex 
discrimination helpful particularly where discriminatory treatment is alleged in highly 
subjective tenure process. Id. at 1342. 
105. Ward v. Westland Plastics Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1980). The plain-
tiff alleged that she was discharged because of sex discrimination evident in the em-
ployer's subjective evaluation of her job performance. Id. at 1269. The court affirmed the 
trial court's finding of no discrimination. Id. at 1270. Subjective evaluations, the court 
noted, are not discriminatory per se nor do they impose a burden of proving absence of 
intentional bias. Id. In a footnote the court apparently endorsed use of impact analysis 
for subjective criteria, the first word on the subject in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1270 n.l. 
106. 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982). 
107. Id. at 1147. 
108. Id. at 1148. 
109. Id. at 1149. 
110. Id. at 1148. 
111. Id. 
15
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aspects of the system and expressed concern over the possibility 
for bias.l12 
The Wang approach has been approved by a number of 
panels in the Ninth Circuit.ll3 Others have chosen to adhere to 
the Heagney rationale and restrict subjective criteria to the dis-
parate treatment model.ll4 A Ninth Circuit panel discussed the 
conflict in Moore v. Hughes Helicoptersll5 and although clearly 
skeptical of applying disparate impact analysis to subjective cri-
teria, the issue was side-stepped because the plaintiff had failed 
to prove the requisite impact.ll6 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE PANEL DECISION 
The issue of the applicability of disparate impact analysis to 
subjective practices was directly before the panel in Atonio v. 
Wards Cove Packing Co.ll7 The disparities existing at the can-
neries were striking and the companies' practices were highly 
discretionary.lls The Atonio panel chose to follow the Heagney 
v. University of Washingtonll9 line of cases as the better rea-
soned approach.120 The panel recognized the tension between Ti-
112. Id. at 1148-49. The practices complained of included the ad hoc determination 
of hiring criteria for a particular job, the use of supervisor evaluations and the system 
used by a supervisors committee to correlate the criteria with the candidates. Id. at 1147. 
The district court found that a language skills requirement was added as a pretext to 
disqualify the plaintiff. Id. at 1147-48 n.2. 
113. See Yartzoff v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1984) (disparate impact 
analysis applied to subjective criteria but no disparate impact shown); Peters v. Lieual-
len, 693 F.2d 966, 969 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (case remanded to determine whether subjec-
tive tests which were not job-related had a prima facie disparate impact on blacks). See 
also Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1436 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (dicta 
recognizing that in some situations disparate impact analysis would be appropriate for 
use of subjective hiring criteria). Peters and Wang were decided by identical panels. 
114. See Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.) (lack 
of well-defined criteria as facilitating wage discrimination is a claim better presented 
under the disparate treatment model), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); EEOC v. In-
land Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (subjective wage-setting criteria 
properly analyzed as a disparate treatment case); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 
864, 866 (9th Cir. 1982) (disparate treatment must be applied to allegations of vague 
promotion criteria). 
115. 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983). 
116. Id. at 481-82. 
117. 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). 
118. Id. at 1124. 
119. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. 
120. Atonio, 768 F.2d at 1132. The panel alao felt constrained by stare decisis to 
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tIe VII ideals and the operation of the free market system.l2l By 
restricting disparate impact analysis to objective selection proce-
dures, employers would be permitted the greatest freedom in de-
fining employment qualifications yet would still be liable for in-
tentional discrimination under the disparate treatment mode1.122 
This holding would be consistent with a perceived Congressional 
policy of minimum interference with employer prerogatives.123 
The panel feared that extending disparate impact analysis to 
subjective decisions, with the consequent elimination of the ne-
cessity of proving discriminatory intent, would impel employers 
to adopt quota hiring systems.124 
B. THE En Banc MAJORITY 
The full bench of the Ninth Circuit in Atonio v. Wards 
Cove Packing CO.125 reversed the panel decision and resolved the 
conflict within the Ninth Circuit by extending application of the 
disparate impact theory to subjective employment practices.126 
Disparate impact and disparate treatment were characterized as 
simply "analytic tools" to be used to ascertain whether there has 
been impermissible discrimination by an employer.127 The Su-
preme Court had sanctioned the use of either theory as applied 
to a particular set of facts.128 The Atonio majority interpreted 
this as authorizing the use of whichever theory was most helpful 
in answering the ultimate question in a given case.129 Prior deci-
sions which had refused to apply impact analysis to subjective 
follow Heagney as the oldest unoverruled precedent. [d. at 1132 n.6. The Wang panel 
was chided for not discussing Heagney. [d. at 1132. 
121. [d. at 1132. 
122. [d. at 1132-33. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
123. [d. at 1132. The panel did not specify which Congressional enactment sup-
ported this policy but rather noted that the Griggs doctrine was judicially created and 
not explicitly provided for in Title VII. The panel was unimpressed with the argument 
that Congress had ratified Griggs in passing the 1972 amendments. [d. See supra notes 
61-65 and accompanying text. 
124. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1132. 
125. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987). 
126. [d. at 1478. 
127. [d. at 1480 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 
1985»; Goodman stated that the search for impermissible discrimination is the ultimate 
question in a Title VII action and cautioned against losing sight of it while enforcing the 
intricate evidentiary rules. [d. 
128. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 
n.15 (1977). See supra note 25. 
129. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1480. 
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practices were expressly overruled.130 Henceforth, a plaintiff in 
the Ninth Circuit may attack subjective practices or criteria if 
his prima facie case contains three elements: (1) proof of a sig-
nificant disparate impact on a protected class, (2) identification 
of specific employment practices or selection criteria and (3) a 
showing of the causal relationship between the identified prac-
tices and the impact.131 
Writing for the majority, Judge Tang132 observed that Title 
VII outlaws discrimination without reference to an objective or 
subjective basis/33 and that the Supreme Court has not ex-
pressly limited the disparate impact theory to purely objective 
criteria.134 The full bench accepted the view that Congress en-
dorsed Griggs and other decisional law when it amended Title 
VII in 1972.1311 Cases at that time had applied impact analysis to 
subjective practices.13s The court reasoned, therefore, that ap-
plying impact analysis to subjective practices would be consis-
tent with Congressional intent.137 
Further support was drawn from the fact that the agencies 
charged with the enforcement of Title VIl13s have promulgated 
regulations which apply the disparate impact theory to all em-
ployee selection procedures without regard to subjective-objec-
tive distinctions.139 These regulations have been accorded great 
deference by the Supreme Court and can be read as communi-
130. Id. at 1486. 
131. Id. at 1482. By requiring proof of a causal connection, Atonio incorporates the 
bare holding of Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). 
See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text. 
132. Judges Tang and Anderson were members of the Atonio panel. 
133. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482 ("Title VII states that it is an unlawful employment 
practice to limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees or applicants for employment in 
any way." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(2)(1982» (emphasis in original). 
134. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482. 
135. Id. at 1482 (citing Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VII 
Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 939 (1985), in which the legislative his-
tory of the 1972 amendments is extensively reviewed. Helfand and Pemberton argue that 
Congressional policy demands an expansive reading of the Griggs doctrine). 
136. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2nd Cir. 
1971). See also United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 802, 804 (4th Cir. 
1970). 
137. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482-83. 
138. Included are the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Per-
sonnel Management, Department of Justice and Department of Labor. 
139. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1483. See supra note 60. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/8
1988] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 145 
cating the will of Congress.140 Since the purpose of Title VII is to 
remove unnecessary barriers to equal employment opportunities, 
Judge Tang believed that limiting disparate impact analysis 
would retard execution of that purpose.141 A subjective practice 
unaccompanied by a conscious intent to discriminate may still 
operate as an unnecessary barrier; therefore the court felt such 
practices should be exposed to disparate impact scrutiny.142 
The Ninth Circuit squarely confronted the argument that 
the Supreme Court had limited use of the disparate impact the-
ory in Furneo Construction Corp. v. Waters.143 Fumeo was dis-
tinguished because the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination under the disparate impact theory.144 
They had not proven that the challenged practice actually had 
an adverse impact on minority applicants.1411 The Atonio plain-
tiffs had fully satisfied the three elements of a prima facie dispa-
rate impact claim.l4S Consequently, Judge Tang interpreted 
Fumeo as imposing "no limitation on the use of impact analysis 
beyond the restrictions inherent in demonstrating a prima facie 
case."l47 Nothing in Furneo forbade analysis of subjective prac-
tices under the Griggs doctrine.148 
The Ninth Circuit was not content to simply support its 
holding with appropriate authority but defended it forcefully on 
the basis of logic and policy. The defendants had contended that 
because subjective decisions are, by nature and definition, reflec-
tive of the decision-maker's conscious motivations, such deci-
sions are unlawful only if an actual intent to discriminate is 
proven.149 This contention was dispelled by the en bane court. A 
subjective practice may be a vehicle for intentional discrimina-
tion, but it may also be discriminatory even though the em-
ployer's conscious intent is completely neutral or even benign.lllo 
140. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1483 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 
(1971». 
141. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1483. 
142. Id. 
143. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
144. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1484. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
149. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1484. 
150. Id. 
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If the subjective practice is used as a covert means to mask dis-
crimination, its very coverture will make it difficult to prove the 
invidious intent.l5l If such practices are causing a disproportion-
ate impact on a protected class, the purposes of Title VII are 
well served by allowing proof of the impact to be the basis of 
liability and thus eliminate the need for proving intent.162 Proof 
of intent may be as undesirable as it is unnecessary because of 
the ill will that such proof may engender .163 
The Ninth Circuit believed that allowing a distinction to be 
made between subjective and objective practices would actually 
subvert the purpose of Title VII because employers bent on dis-
criminating would be encouraged to dispense with objective 
standards in an effort to avoid judicial scrutiny.164 The full 
bench perceived the distinction as basically meaningless because 
most selection procedures encompass both objective and subjec-
tive elements.166 Since the area is so grey, courts would continue 
to have difficulty discerning when disparate impact analysis 
would be proper.168 Therefore, insisting on a meaningless dis-
tinction would not be helpful to future trial courts.167 
The Ninth Circuit considered whether its decision would 
impose an unfair burden on employers. In rebutting a prima fa-
cie disparate impact claim, the court discerned no inherent un-
fairness in forcing an employer defending a subjective practice 
to shoulder the same burden as an employer defending objective 
criteria.168 In either case the heavy burden of proving business 
necessity is appropriate because of the employer's unique posi-
tion as the party most knowledgeable about the purposes and 
effects of his employment practices.169 Such a burden is com-
mensurate with the plaintiff's task in proving his prima facie 
case.180 The court approved of challenging numerous practices 
either individually or collectively as long as the requisite show-
151. Id. 
152.Id. 
153.Id. 
154. Id. at 1485. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 1486. 
160. Id. at 1485. 
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ing of a causal connection to a disparity is made.161 If the de-' 
fendant's burden is arduous it is because Title VII's purpose of 
extinguishing discriminatory employment practices mandates 
that it be SO.162 That purpose is best realized, the court held, by 
submitting subjective employment practices to disparate impact 
analysis.163 
C. CONCURRENCE 
The concurring opinion evidences a concern that the major-
ity's opinion may lead to disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment being used interchangeably.164 Because the majority pro-
vided no guidance in determining in which situations each 
theory should be used, Judge Sneed proposed some standards of 
differentiation.161) He advanced a theory that would look to the 
function of the challenged practice as a means of determining 
whether disparate impact or disparate treatment is the correct 
theory to apply.166 He agreed with the majority that the subjec-
tive-objective distinction was not a meaningful one.167 Under his 
theory, disparate impact analysis would be proper whenever the 
plaintiff has challenged a practice that renders his true qualifica-
tions irrelevant.16s If the employer has ignored the plaintiff's 
known qualifications for an allegedly discriminatory reason, the 
claim is properly analyzed under the disparate treatment 
model.l69 The nature of the wrong as pleaded and proved will 
determine which theory is applicable.170 The respective burdens 
should be allocated accordingly.l7l 
Judge Sneed acknowledged that his theory had not as yet 
been adopted by any court but that its application was consis-
tent with the results reached in a number of cases in which simi-
161. [d. at 1486 n.6. 
162. [d. at 1486. 
163. [d. 
164. [d. (Sneed, J., concurring). 
165. [d. at 1486·87 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
166. [d. at 1489 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
167. [d. 
168. [d. at 1490 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
169. [d. 
170. [d. at 1490-91 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
171. [d. at 1491 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
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lar questions had been examined.172 The canneries' practices 
were subjected to Judge Sneed's theory rendering results some-
what at odds with the majority.173 Under his theory, the plain-
tiff's claims of discrimination in connection with rehiring poli-
cies, subjective criteria and segregation in housing and messing 
were correctly dismissed by the district court.174 But he believed 
that the separate hiring channel and nepotism claims should 
have been remanded for analysis under the disparate impact 
theory.l711 
V. CRITIQUE 
The full bench of the Ninth Circuit has restored a mighty 
weapon to the arsenal of the Title VII plaintiff by permitting 
subjective employment practices to be attacked through dispa-
rate impact analysis. A plaintiff who can prove that a significant 
statistical disparity is causally linked to an employment practice 
is relieved of the necessity of proving that the disparity was 
caused by purposeful discrimination.176 The Atonio court per-
formed exhaustive analysis which relied on the high ideals of Ti-
tle VII and an expansive interpretation of Supreme Court prece-
dents. While cognizant that employer prerogatives would be 
restricted by its decision, the en bane court appreciated that the 
basic premise of Title VII demands that employers not be free 
to utilize practices which may foster discrimination.177 
The Ninth Circuit refused to accept a conceptually rigid 
distinction between the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories. Acceptance of a supposed bright line drawn be-
tween subjective and objective practices would have led to se-
vere restrictions on the use of disparate impact analysis. Instead, 
the Atonio court adopted a pragmatic approach which described 
the two theories as analytic tools useful in identifying impermis-
sible discrimination.l78 Title VII litigation in the Ninth Circuit 
will now focus on the ultimate question of discrimination rather 
172. Id. at 1491 n.4 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
173. Id. at 1492-94 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
174. Id. at 1493-94 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
175. Id. at 1493 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
176. Id. at 1480. 
177. Id. at 1485. 
178. Id. at 1479. 
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than on ancillary characterization issues. Such an approach can 
only enhance the likelihood that the goals of Title VII will even-
tually be achieved. 
Affirming the original panel decision would have created an 
incentive for employers to institute subjective procedures which 
would be vulnerable only to disparate treatment attack. Under 
the disparate treatment analysis, an employer need only articu-
late a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his employment 
decisions.179 A subjective practice having a disproportionate im-
pact would violate Title VII only upon proof of the discrimina-
tor's unlawful state of mind. An employer would not have to 
prove the business necessity of his subjective practice. Since 
subjective practices have long been recognized as being particu-
larly susceptible to discriminatory abuse,180 it would be anomo-
lous to impose a lighter burden on employers using such prac-
tices while demanding that objective practices be more 
rigorously scrutinized. By rejecting this anomoly the Ninth Cir-
cuit's en bane decision is likely to spur employers to examine 
their procedures to eliminate sources of subtle discrimination.181 
Where subjective practices are immune from disparate im-
pact analysis, characterization of a challenged practice is of criti-
cal importance.182 Plaintiffs would have to carefully draft their 
disparate impact claims in terms of objective practices while de-
fendants would emphasize the subjective aspects of those prac-
tices. By recognizing that such a distinction is not meaningful,183 
the Ninth Circuit has freed trial courts from having to decide if 
a particular practice is subjective or objective. The Atonio court 
realized that there is no bright line between subjective and ob-
jective employment practices.184 By focusing on the ultimate 
179. See supra note 30. 
180. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
181. See Denis, Subjective Decision Making: Does It Have a Place in the Employ-
ment Process?, 11 EMPL. REL. L. J. 269 (1985) (practical advice to employers for avoiding 
Title VII liability). 
182. Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 
28 SUP. CT. REV. 17, 29-30 (1979) (arguing that current confused standards of adverse 
impact and job validation are detrimental to economic productivity without promoting 
equal employment opportunity). 
183. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1485. "When we view employment practices from the per-
spective of their impact on a protected class we are unable to see a principled and mean-
ingful difference between subjective and objective practices." Id. 
184. Id. The facts of Atonia are illustrative of this point as word-of-mouth recruit-
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question of discrimination, the Ninth Circuit's Atonio opinion 
reflects a determination to advance the purposes of Title VII 
and not be preoccupied with procedural niceties. The Ninth Cir-
cuit is unconcerned that the line between disparate impact and 
disparate treatment may become blurred as long as the eradica-
tion of discrimination and its effects is furthered.181) 
The Atonio court provided welcome guidance to future trial 
courts and litigants by clarifying the elements necessary for a 
prima facie disparate impact case. The court emphasized that a 
plaintiff must prove a causal link between specific, identified 
practices and the bottom line disparity.18s By stressing this 
causal link, the en bane court disarmed those who fear that in-
discriminate use of the disparate impact theory could impose an 
injustice on an employer forced to defend his entire selection 
process.187 The plaintiff, not the defendant, must link the dis-
parity to specific practices and not simply rest after proving the 
imbalance. However, the court expressly provided that practices, 
once identified, could be considered individually and collec-
tively.188 As long as a plaintiff is specific, Atonio does not limit 
the range or number of practices which can be attacked and 
linked to the disparity. The link in Atonio was established infer-
entially through the identification of the practices and proof of 
the disparity.189 This will probably be the usual method of es-
tablishing the connection, but since the burden is on the plain-
tiff, in a close case, direct proof may be required. 
In assessing the relative evidentiary burdens in a disparate 
impact case, the Atonio court believed that the employer's heavy 
ment, rehire policies and nepotism all include both subjective and objective elements. 
185. [d. at 1486. 
186. [d. 
187. See Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Ct. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 
(1985). In Segar, an employee's challenge of the cumulative effect of a company's prac-
tices was found appropriate where the plaintiff could make out a prima facie showing of 
a significant disparity. [d. at 1266. Defendant, in rebuttal would have to identify which 
practice caused the disparity to meet his burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the disparity. [d. at 1270. With plaintiff's proof and defendant's identi-
fication of the specific practice, all elements of a disparate impact case would be before 
the court. [d. at 1271. Thus, there would be no reason why defendant should not prove 
the business necessity of the practice which he has identified. [d. 
188. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1486 n.6. 
189. [d. 
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rebuttal burden would be commensurate with the plaintiff's dif-
ficult task in establishing a prima facie case.190 Emphasis on the 
difficulty of the plaintiff's undertaking seems to be implicit rec-
ognition that justifying the necessity of a disparity-causing sub-
jective practice may be impossible.l9l Nevertheless, such a prac-
tice must be justified or it violates Title VII. An employer must 
change his practices or be prepared to contest the elements of 
the plaintiff's prima facie case. The plaintiff's statistical evi-
dence may be attacked as inaccurate, incomplete, non-probative 
or false.192 Only after all the elements have been established and 
the employer has failed to discredit the prima facie case does the 
defendant's arduous burden of proving business necessity arise. 
The broad implications of Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing 
Co. should not be underestimated. Virtually any employment 
practice may subject an employer to Title VII liability if it dis-
proportionately impacts a protected group and cannot be justi-
fied.193 The Ninth Circuit swept away artificial limitations on 
the use of the theory. Instead, Atonia suggests that the bounda-
ries of the disparate impact theory are only those "restrictions 
190. Id. at 1486. 
191. Where the qualifications for a job can be readily measured in terms of objec-
tive, quantifiable skills, such as the blue collar jobs at issue in Atonio, subjective assess-
ments of applicants will rarely, if ever, be justifiable under Title VII standards. A more 
difficult problem is posed when the jobs in question, such as those in Heagney v. Univer-
sity of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981), have unique or difficult to define qual-
ifications. Arguably subjective standards are more defensible in the latter case. Nothing 
in Judge Tang's opinion suggests limiting the use of disparate impact analysis. Whether 
the disparate impact theory should be used to evaluate discrimination in upper level jobs 
is a question which has generated considerable academic discussion. See, e.g. Bartholet, 
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1982); Maltz, 
Title VII and Upper Level Employment - A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 776 (1983); Newman, Remedies for Discrimination in Supervisorial and Man-
agerial Jobs, 13 HARV. CR-CL. REV. 633 (1978); Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employ-
ment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV. 737 (1976). 
192. Although the order of proof in a disparate impact case is described as a three-
part process, an intermediate step exists where the defendant may attempt to refute the 
plaintiff's prima facie case. Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search 
for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 384 n.38 (1981). See supra note 46. 
193. Since the court explicitly overruled the panel decision, subsequent cases which 
relied on it may now have their authority questioned. Notably AFSCME v. Washington, 
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) where in a comparable worth challenge to the state's prac-
tice of paying salaries based on prevailing market forces, the court reversed the district 
court's finding of Title VII liability based on application of disparate impact analysis. 
Citing the Atonio panel, the court found the practice not to be one to which the dispa-
rate impact theory is properly applied. Id. at 1405-06. 
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inherent in demonstrating a prima facie case.m94 This test, de-
rived from the Ninth Circuit's expansive reading of Supreme 
Court cases, recognizes that not every employment practice can 
have its impact defined and measured. Such practices would be 
resistant to disparate impact challenge simply because of the 
difficulty of proving a prima facie case. The disparate impact 
theory is based on proving discrimination through a statistically 
significant showing. It follows that the boundaries of the theory 
are to be found in the science of statistics and not in an arbi-
trary distinction between subjective and objective criteria.195 By 
refusing to limit disparate impact analysis to objective criteria, 
the Ninth Circuit has chosen to permit expansion of the theory 
to its logical limits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit is now firmly among those circuits which 
refuse to limit application of the disparate impact theory to 
purely objective employment practices.196 Minority and female 
employees may be expected to demand that all manner of em-
ployment practices which have tended to exclude them from em-
ployment opportunities be justified under the rigorous test of 
business necessity. Unless the United States Supreme Court im-
poses limitations on its use, the disparate impact theory is avail-
able to employees at any level to challenge any employment 
practice within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit as long as he 
or she can satisfy the elements of a prima facie case. 
Donald A. Tine* 
194. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1484. 
195. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
& Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987), to hear the 
single question: "Is the racially adverse impact of an employer's practice of simply com-
mitting employment decisions to the unchecked discretion of a white supervisory corps 
subject to the test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)?" 43 EMPL. PRAC. 
GUIDE (CCH) , 37,130 (JUNE 22, 1987). By answering this question the Supreme Court 
should settle the issue of whether the disparate impact theory is applicable to subjective 
employment practices. 
196. See supra note 103. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
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